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Introduction
This article examines the response of the Churches to the Anglo-Irish 
War.1 The attitude of the Irish hierarchy to the First World War is contrast-
ed with their view of the 1916 Rising to provide background and contrast to 
ecclesiastical reactions to the Anglo-Irish War, and to determine the extent 
to which just war criteria played a part in these judgements. Their response to 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty provides further material for contrast and comparison. 
It is apparent that the major point of contention was a key aspect of the jus 
ad bellum, the issue of right authority, and this was the point which was as-
serted by Britain in its claim to continue governing Ireland. It is argued that 
this was also the underlying assumption of the churches in Ireland.
The First World War and the Easter Rising
The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was established in 1913 with the 
aim of preventing the establishment of a Home Rule parliament under the 
Third Home Rule Act.2 The Irish Volunteers, formed in response to the cre-
ation of the UVF, were split over the issue of recruitment into the British 
Army to fight in the First World War. Irish recruitment was actively sup-
ported by John Redmond, MP for Waterford City at Westminster, with the 
larger group, now called the National Volunteers, backing Redmond.3 The 
abstentionist group, now called the Irish Volunteers, mounted in an armed 
rebellion in Dublin in 1916, now called the 1916 Rising, declaring Ireland 
to be a Republic; however, the rising failed and the leaders were executed.4 
However, the Sinn Féin party, created by the surviving leaders of the Ris-
ing, campaigned on the platform of independence from Britain. The General 
Election of 1918 saw Sinn Féin win the majority of nationalist seats.5 instead 
of taking their seats at Westminster, they set up an independent parliament 
in Dublin, in keeping with their election manifesto.6 The refusal of the Brit-
ish Government to recognise this newly declared Republic, and the refusal 
of the Sinn Féin Government to abandon their mandate, led to the Anglo-
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Irish War of 1919-1921, which ultimately finished with the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922.7
The response of the Protestant representatives of Ulster to the passing 
of the Home Rule Act was to provide moral support for the UVF and their 
threat to rebel if Home Rule were implemented. John Crozier, Archbishop of 
Armagh, devoted himself unreservedly to the preservation of the “Protestant 
province” and the arming of the Unionists, and along with the Presbyterian 
Moderator, Henry Montgomery, presided at a rally of 100,000 members of 
the newly-formed UVF on 13th April 1912.Charles D’Arcy, Bishop of Down 
and Connor, the Bishop of Derry, the Bishop of Clogher, among others, re-
sponded in similar terms.8 This forms a marked contrast to the attitude of the 
Irish Catholic clergy to the rise of the Irish Volunteers, the armed Nationalist 
group formed in 1914 in response to the creation and arming of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force. Many individual churchmen, if not the Church as a whole, 
regarded it as a threat of physical force against duly constituted authority.9
With the outbreak of war and the declaration of support by John Red-
mond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, this stance by the Catholic 
bishops moderated to a degree, but only to the extent that the purpose of the 
Irish Volunteers coincided with that of Redmond’s Party. One bishop who 
was particularly fulsome in his commitment to recruitment and war was Pat-
rick Foley, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, who represented the War in terms 
of a holy crusade on the part of the armies of “justice and right”.10 The Irish 
Catholic was likewise unquestioning in its support. Six bishops sent congrat-
ulations to Redmond regarding the promise of home rule contained in the 
Government of Ireland Act.11 Taking into account expressions of opinion in 
speeches, letters to the press and so forth, an estimated twenty-one out of 
the twenty-seven bishops favoured the War, with three neutral, one (Cardi-
nal Logue) undecided and two (Archbishop Walsh and Bishop O’Dwyer) 
opposed.12 In contrast to their expressions of spiritual support for armed re-
bellion in the face of an ordinance of the British Parliament, the Protestant 
prelates were also in favour of a war against Germany. The Church of Ireland 
Gazette enthusiastically hailed the War as an opportunity to unite North and 
South through “crushing the common enemy... of all civilisation,”13 and the 
Protestant Primate went even further, hailing it as the most righteous war in 
history.14 Redmond was praised by John Bernard, Protestant Bishop of Os-
sory, for his support for the War.15
The escalation of what was initially presented as a defence of Belgian 
neutrality into a global war brought with it destruction on a proportional 
scale, and this was one factor leading to loss of support for the War among 
many Irish Catholic bishops, so that by April 1916 only nine still supported 
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the War. Bishop Browne of Cloyne, for example, upheld the comparison be-
tween Ireland and Belgium.16 Benedict XV’s appeal on 28 July 1915 to “put 
an end... to this horrible slaughter”17 undoubtedly had a strong influence on 
this change. Other developments, such as the participation of Edward Car-
son in the new British cabinet, may also have had some bearing. The view 
among Protestant clergymen of the War itself as a kind of divine interven-
tion against Home Rule was not uncommon,18 and Protestant commitment 
to the War came to be represented as a blood sacrifice for the sake of main-
taining the Union.19
This hardening of attitude among the Irish Catholic bishops led to ac-
cusations that they were pro-German, though Archbishop Bernard dismissed 
this in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, referring instead to their 
“disloyalty to the King, to Great Britain and to the Empire”.20 Some bishops, 
while still supporting Redmond, had reversed their views on the War since 
the previous year, one such being Abraham Brownrigg, who referred to it as 
“a shocking war for Christians”.21 The view which seemed to predominate, 
particularly after the Pope’s intervention, was that the conduct of the War 
made it unjustifiable in the eyes of the Church. However, it is noteworthy 
that such publications as The Tablet, which represented the voice of the Eng-
lish Catholic Church, had no qualms about the bloodshed of the War or its 
justification, and simply omitted any mention of the opposition to the War in 
Ireland, publishing only the Lenten pastorals of Bishops O’Donnell, Browne 
and McHugh, which were favourable to the War.22 The Church of Ireland, 
like its English counterpart, did not waver in its support in the face of the 
carnage, regarding the prayers for peace offered by Irish Catholic bishops as 
a matter of greater concern.23
The 1916 Rising forced Irish prelates to confront the issue of the justi-
fiability of armed rebellion. Their assumption at the outset of the First World 
War was, firstly, that Britain had the moral right to declare war, and, second-
ly, that just cause for war had been presented. However, the morality of Irish 
participation had been glossed over, and tended rather to be presented as 
more of a matter of quid pro quo than of duty to a lawful authority. Indeed, the 
issue of lawful authority proved to be the principal obstacle for the Catholic 
bishops in issuing an outright condemnation of the Rising. Patrick Murray’s 
assertion that the Rising did not meet any of the theological requirements 
for a just rebellion24 in fact sidesteps the issue: aside from the difficulty in-
volved in securing popular consent to a rebellion, had the original orders for 
the Rising not been countermanded, an argument could be made that there 
was in fact a reasonable chance of success. The case could also be made that 
“intolerable and manifest tyranny” was actually manifested in the betrayal of 
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the Irish who had volunteered to fight for Britain on the promise of Home 
Rule. In any case, the fact that the issue was less than clear-cut is discernible 
in the variety of responses on the part of the Irish bishops.
The Protestant clergy’s response to the Rising was as ferocious and un-
equivocal in its condemnation as its support for the escalating mass carnage 
in Europe was passionate and unwavering. Archbishop Bernard of Dublin 
argued against the general pardon issued by Asquith (in an attempt to calm 
public opinion inflamed by the executions of the Rising’s leaders25 ) calling 
instead for still more severe punishment.26 The Presbyterian journal Witness 
issued dire warnings of the horror and slaughter that would ensue if the Prot-
estants were left to the mercy of the likes of Sinn Féin,27 and even, in an at-
tempt to undermine the argument for self-government, denied that Ireland 
was a nation. The Church of Ireland Gazette praised the British soldiers who 
put down the rebellion as saviours from the horrors of revolution,28 this de-
spite the Gazette’s own enthusiasm for a war which was in truth a revolution 
many orders of magnitude greater than the current object of its outrage. The 
general sense of indignation at the Rising also formed a marked contrast to 
the enthusiasm with which Northern Protestant prelates had themselves, just 
a short time previously, participated in UVF rallies and supported the UVF’s 
opposition to the government to which they implied Irish Catholics should 
adhere with unwavering enthusiasm.
The reaction of the Catholic prelates appeared to be comparable in its 
vehemence, with seven unreservedly condemning the Rising on the Sunday 
following its suppression.29 Bishop Hoare of Ardagh employed two jus ad 
bellum principles, that there must be a just cause, which he identified with 
there being “a real grievance and clear oppression,” and that there must be a 
strong probability of success, arguing that neither was present in this case.30 
However, he did express a hope that the British Government would follow a 
policy of clemency, as he recognised that the executions had galvanised pub-
lic opinion. Bishop Kelly of Ross refused to moderate his condemnation on 
this score, stating, despite the obvious involvement of British forces in crush-
ing the Rising, that it was an Irish war for which the Irish were entirely to 
blame.31 Bishop Gilmartin of Clonfert likewise summarised his view of the 
conditions for justifiable revolt with some differences, namely that the gov-
ernment be judged by the majority of people to be tyrannical, that there be 
no legal means of redress available, and that armed resistance would avoid 
greater evils than it sought to remedy. However, he stated that he did not in-
tend to “cast any aspersion on those who may have seemed to take a different 
view”.32 The silence of the other twenty four prelates may have been indica-
tive of an actual unwillingness to condemn the Rising33 or merely a matter of 
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prudence pending consultation at the June meeting of the hierarchy.34 Nev-
ertheless, their silence gave the impression, perhaps unintended, of approval, 
and specifically approval of Bishop O’Dwyer’s uncompromising defence of 
the Rising in just war terms.
O’Dwyer’s address to Limerick Corporation on 14 September 1916 
stated that the Rising was an assertion of the right to self-rule, and that the 
same standards used in the case of Belgian resistance to the German incur-
sion, the Serbian revolt against Austria, et al., should also be applied to the 
Rising.35 Bishop Patrick Foley, in correspondence with O’Dwyer, took issue 
with these statements, claiming that in his interpretation of Leo XIII’s pro-
nouncements on the issue, and in the view of subsequent writers, rebellion is 
never lawful in a case where there is no violation of the agreement between 
people and sovereign on the latter’s part, and that, moreover, civil power de-
rives immediately from God, not the people.36 O’Dwyer responded by ques-
tioning whether the same accusation of unlawfulness might be applied to the 
American revolt against England, for instance, and stating that, since English 
government of Ireland was de facto alone and had no moral sanction, rebellion 
was by implication lawful.37 He further countered Foley’s assertion of the di-
vine bequest of power to the sovereign, stating that, in essence, Leo’s teach-
ing was that the bond between people and sovereign is sacred, in whatever 
form it might take, but that he did not thereby intend to delimit the juris-
diction of sovereigns or the rights of subjects so far as to claim, for instance, 
that resistance was forbidden under any circumstance. O’Dwyer instead in-
terpreted the doctrine to mean that only self-preservation, not bad govern-
ment, forms an acceptable pretext for rebellion, such as in a case where the 
sovereign power acts against the nation itself; in that instance the act of re-
bellion must be undertaken by common consent.38 Foley countered that the 
denial of Home Rule could not be considered a grievance sufficient to justify 
rebellion.39 While nearly all the scholastics believed that the community as a 
whole had the right to rebel, this only applied to cases where the rulers were 
elected.40 The implication was that, in the case of rule by inheritance, such as 
monarchy, the only right to rebellion is that of self-defence, and that other-
wise it would be an act of aggression. He concluded that an outside author-
ity is desirable in order to decide whether a government can be described as 
a tyranny and whether there is a prospect of success, and that the only ques-
tion would be in which body that authority would be vested.41 O’Dwyer re-
sponded that restricting the power to make such determinations to the Holy 
See would imply that the question was one only for Catholics rather than an 
issue relating to Christian ethics in the broad sense.42
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O’Dwyer and Foley were in agreement that there are certain conditions 
in which people are entitled to rebel against duly constituted authority. While 
O’Dwyer held that the conduct of the Imperial Government towards Ire-
land rendered its authority to govern that country morally unsustainable, and 
hence by extension justified rebellion and a claim to self-government, Foley 
denied both premise and conclusion, though he was less certain concerning 
the ultimate conditions under which a ruler’s behaviour could be described as 
tyrannical and under which rebellion is licit. Second, and more importantly, 
both were in agreement that, discounting the question of misgovernment, 
the Imperial Parliament’s authority to govern Ireland was a given. This was 
in spite of the fact that the Parliament’s mandate had run out in 1915, and 
that Asquith’s 1915 coalition government, formed during wartime, had not 
been elected. The conclusion that might be drawn from this correspondence 
is that the Irish Catholic Church did not hold popular approval to be a nec-
essary condition for a government to claim authority over a people, and thus 
to wage war, yet it cited the same condition as being absolutely necessary to 
justify armed rebellion.
Cardinal Logue’s pastoral of 25 November 1917 went some way toward 
impeding Catholic Church support for Sinn Féin, or at least support of what 
it interpreted as Sinn Féin’s “constitutional” aspirations.43 Logue was emphat-
ic in his condemnation of the establishment of an Irish Republic, whether 
by seeking its recognition at the Peace Conference or through armed rebel-
lion, both of which he seemed to consider as being morally on a par. Logue 
relied primarily on the principle of reasonable prospect of success, arguing 
that, given the means of destruction available to the British Empire, it would 
be folly to think of facing it in rebellion. However, perhaps the most signifi-
cant aspect of Logue’s condemnation is the absence of the assumption that 
it is morally wrong per se to engage in armed rebellion. Perhaps Logue con-
sidered the aspect of reasonable prospect of success to be sufficiently com-
pelling in its own right, but, particularly given the strength of his rhetoric on 
this single point, it is noteworthy that he omitted any other considerations 
against justified rebellion.
The passing of the Military Service Act in April 1918, which intro-
duced conscription in Ireland, precipitated a unification of nationalist opin-
ion in opposition to the measure, including the Catholic hierarchy and clergy, 
though this did not survive beyond the East Cavan by-election in June.44 The 
Episcopal Standing Committee met on the day the Conscription Bill was in-
troduced, stating that there would be no need for the measure if Britain were 
to extend to Ireland the principles in defence of which it had gone to war,45 
but clearly Britain thought otherwise. Rev. P. Coffey, Professor of Logic and 
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Metaphysics at St. Patrick’s College Maynooth, declared that, some dissent-
ers aside, non-Catholics were at one with their Catholic countrymen in re-
jecting England’s authority in this matter.46
The basis on which Coffey defended armed resistance is noteworthy. 
He acknowledged that Ireland was subject to the Imperial Parliament, but as 
a distinct nation rather than after the manner of England, and when forced 
to merge its parliament with that of England did not surrender its right of 
consent to such measures.47 Considering the objection that acquiescence in 
the authority of the Parliament and collaboration with its administration led 
to it becoming the de jure authority over time, he suggested that this author-
ity rested entirely on superior physical force.48 Furthermore, he states that, 
given the consistent subjection in which the Irish were held by the English 
and the fact that they were effectively treated as outlaws in their own land, 
if English rule at the time of the conquest had no moral authority, “noth-
ing that happened subsequently up to the time of the Union could possibly 
have secured such authority for it”.49 He concluded that the mere lapse of 
time cannot give a conquering nation de jure authority over the conquered, 
but that it must govern in such a way that it secures their consent. The con-
dition for the legitimacy of a conquering power is therefore just government, 
consent to which obliges the subject nation to obedience.50 However, a small 
nation’s proper end, its common good, “might not be attained by aiming at 
full self-government”, whereas it may be attained by aiming at the status of 
a dependent but mainly self-governing entity within a larger federation or 
empire.51 Coffey, therefore, went further than O’Dwyer, in that he argued, 
not that armed rebellion was justified by the Imperial Parliament’s conduct 
on the issue of Home Rule, but rather that the Parliament’s authority to leg-
islate for Ireland was never legitimate in the first place. Rebellion against a 
specific measure passed by the Imperial Parliament in respect of the people 
of Ireland would therefore be legitimate by virtue of the lack of consent, not 
to this specific measure, but to the authority of that Parliament. This Parlia-
ment in turn had failed to secure the moral authority to impose such mea-
sures, as it had governed Ireland as hostile territory rather than as a country 
entitled to the same rights and subject to the same obligations as the inhab-
itants of Great Britain.
The hierarchy’s defiance on the issue of conscription was given its de-
finitive statement at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Irish 
Catholic bishops on 9 April 1918. The statement, written by eight bishops, 
including Logue, all of whom were known for their conservative opinions on 
political matters, emphasised the lack of consent to the measure on the part 
of the Irish people: “To enforce conscription here without the consent of the 
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people would be perfectly unwarrantable... Had the Government in any rea-
sonable time given Ireland the benefit of the principles which are declared to 
be at stake in the War, by the concession of a full measure of self-government, 
there would have been no occasion for contemplating forced levies from her 
now”.52 This was effectively a denial on the part of the hierarchy that the Im-
perial Parliament had the authority to enforce the measure in Ireland.
One response to the crisis on the Northern Protestant side was par-
ticularly remarkable given the furore over the Rising. The Very Rev. Joseph 
Brady of Armagh, claiming to be following the example of Edward Carson, 
organised a series of meetings of priests and people of the parish with the 
objective of founding a “Solemn League and Covenant” against conscription. 
In the case of this league, however, the procurement of weapons and drilling 
would be eschewed in favour of the “constitutional” resort of passive resis-
tance, which was not theologically problematic.53 The support offered to Car-
son’s insurrectionist UVF by the British Conservative Party suggested that 
armed force against the Government would meet with approval in the former 
case even if it did not in the case of the latter.54 This apparent demonstration 
of solidarity with the Southern Catholic position did not have any positive 
impact on British Catholic opinion, as indicated by The Tablet’s defence of 
conscription.55 This was hardly surprising. Whereas Irish Catholic prelates 
had condemned the Rising in terms of the illegality of rebellion against law-
ful authority, the Church had now officially committed itself to an act of re-
bellion against that same authority on the issue of conscription.
The Anglo-Irish War
The general consensus among Irish prelates regarding the armed cam-
paign following the election of Sinn Féin in 1918 was to asset a moral pre-
sumption against the use of force. While this stance may seem inconsistent 
given the initial enthusiasm with which the same prelates had embraced Brit-
ain’s war effort in 1914, the underlying assumption was in fact unchanged. 
While their support for this war faded due to the escalating carnage in Eu-
rope, though this was not the only consideration, the IRA’s armed campaign 
against the British forces was placed on the same moral footing with the 
actions of the latter. The position, in other words, was that the IRA had no 
right to resort to war in the first place, and this judgement permitted their 
campaign to be addressed in the same terms as the British attack on the Dáil. 
Despite the political changes that occurred with the 1918 General Election, 
the position of the Churches was that the context for their pronouncements 
35
Just War in the Irish Context: The Response of the Irish Churches to Republican Armed Force, 1916-1921
was the same as it had been in 1916. Abuses of power aside, elected or not, 
the Imperial Parliament was held to be the only government of Ireland, and 
therefore it alone had the authority to wage war.
Fr. William Delany J, President of University College Dublin, in a let-
ter to Archbishop Walsh in November 1920, condemned IRA actions as 
“abominable assassinations” the doing of which incurred the penalty of ex-
communication.56 Likewise Logue, while denouncing British actions, like-
wise associated the IRA campaign with Bolshevism,57 while his pastoral let-
ter of 21 December equated the two sides in moral terms, stating that armed 
force was not the proper Christian response to British repression.58 The bish-
ops’ statement from Maynooth on 24 June blamed Britain for provoking the 
situation, rejecting British claims that reprisals were not official policy,59 but 
nevertheless condemned IRA actions, suggesting that the acts of both sides 
were morally indistinguishable.60 While it would be easy to read the bishops’ 
condemnation of British actions as being the more significant factor,61 thus 
overshadowing their condemnation of the IRA campaign as “crimes,” the lat-
ter characterisation is in fact the more relevant, given that it serves to remove 
any substantial ground for criticising the British campaign. Although Bish-
ops O’Doherty of Clonfert and O’Dea of Galway and Archbishop Gilmartin 
of Tuam castigated Hamar Greenwood and Nevil Macready for imposing a 
policy of reprisals,62 they did not question the right of the British authori-
ties to engage in warfare in Ireland in the first place. This right was explicitly 
denied to the IRA by O’Dea, for example, who stated that no legitimate au-
thority had declared or authorised a war against “the police”, i.e. the RIC.63 
This denial that the Irish Government was acting in self-defence during the 
Anglo-Irish War was typical of the bishops’ responses; however, it was not the 
reason the bishops held the IRA’s campaign to be unjust. They were making 
the wider claim that, whether or not there was a just cause, the Irish Gov-
ernment had no moral right to fight at all. Given that the denial of the right 
to go to war is, in effect, the denial of legitimate authority, in uttering this 
denial the hierarchy were defending the British claim to be the legitimate 
government in Ireland.
Walter McDonald’s Some Ethical Questions of Peace and War was intend-
ed as a reply to the article by Rev. Coffey, though, as the book was published 
in 1919, its line of argument has a wider significance. Though the argument 
purports to oppose itself to the general trend of ecclesiastical opinion, it in 
fact provides at greater length a defence of the very same position expressed 
by most of the bishops, that, election or no election, the Imperial Parliament 
was the only legitimate government of Ireland through right of conquest, 
and that, election or no election, warfare against that government could have 
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no justification. McDonald represented Coffey’s argument, “which seems to 
represent the mind of Sinn Féin”,64 as claiming that no independent nation 
ceases to be independent de jure except by popular consent, and as Ireland 
was at one time an independent nation, and never consented to resign that 
status, Ireland was therefore independent de jure. The main point in this refu-
tation was the assumption that unity of rule and independence are requisites 
of nationhood,65 and this allowed McDonald to arrive rapidly at the conclu-
sion that Ireland was not a nation. The conflation of nationhood with state-
hood led naturally to the conclusion that Ireland had no separate identity 
from England as a nation.
However, McDonald was quite clearly contending that the basis of au-
thority is conquest, and that self-determination is not a fundamental right 
of any nation66 but something that is earned after tutelage by the conquer-
ing power. It is not necessary to exaggerate the significance of McDonald’s 
views on the inferiority of native peoples and the need to provide them with 
enlightened tutelage in the ways of civilization,67 except that they formed the 
basis for the doctrine of development,68 whereby a people was held only to 
become worthy of self-rule, presumably in the eyes of an imperial power, if 
they were deemed to be sufficiently advanced. McDonald’s argument is that 
the people of Ireland would only be entitled to self-rule, firstly, if they were 
far enough “advanced in culture” to be capable of government, and secondly, 
provided that they may be trusted to make legitimate use of it, not to “secure 
a larger measure of independence than is their due”.69
McDonald demonstrates the utility of the doctrine in his reference to 
the Irish Republic, where he claims that only a third of the electorate voted 
for it, while a “considerable number” did so just to oust the Parliamentary 
Party or to secure a fuller measure of Home Rule.70 Thus, a general election, 
the sole aim of which is to determine who governs according to which poli-
cy, was transformed by McDonald into a referendum on Home Rule, the at-
tainment of which even the Home Rule party knew was a dead letter, and 
well before that time.71 However, he is prepared to justify the resort to arms 
to secure independence if, in the hypothetical case, Ireland were “entitled” to 
such, and if there were reasonable prospect of success, or even if Ireland were 
to be denied Home Rule.72 McDonald never addresses the question of why 
Ireland should have been entitled to self-determination in the form of Home 
Rule under the auspices of the Imperial Parliament, yet not entitled to self-
determination in the form of independence, as surely, if Ireland were devel-
oped enough to demand, and be entitled to, the one, it would be sufficiently 
developed for independence as well.
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McDonald conceded that the demand for revolution is effectively the 
right to undertake it, given certain limitations. However, the result is that he 
granted to force of arms what he was unwilling to grant to the ballot box, ar-
guing that revolutionaries are not in opposition to legitimate authority when 
independence becomes due, as they are the legitimate authority.73 In other 
words, the imperial power decides whether a country is deserving of indepen-
dence, and may either concede independence by its own act and in its own 
interests (in which case it is not independence) or may be fought legitimately 
for independence.
The most thorough and substantive application of just war criteria with 
respect to the Anglo-Irish War appears in the pastoral letters of Daniel Co-
halan, Bishop of Cork. While Cohalan held that the British government’s 
authority over Ireland had no moral sanction, being based simply on force,74 
it did not follow that there was a moral right to engage in armed resistance. 
He counselled submission to state oppression, given that active resistance 
would lead to further unlawful oppression from the British side. As Pádraig 
Corkery indicates, this line was consistent with that given in the October 
1920 statement by the Irish Bishops.75 However, Cohalan’s concern that civil 
order might be disrupted by active resistance to oppression is a little odd in 
context, given that such oppression was, in 1920, the source of a great deal of 
civil disorder. Furthermore, in his application of just war principles Cohalan 
did not see justice as lying on either side, choosing instead to regard all kill-
ings, whether of civilians, British Army, RIC or IRA as murder.76
Cohalan’s use of the jus in bello principle of proportionality can be iden-
tified in his treatment of the British policy of reprisals. IRA attacks on mem-
bers of the RIC or the British Army would invariably lead to civilian deaths 
and the destruction of property, and therefore were in breach of the princi-
ple.77 However, the reasoning used by Cohalan is rather tortuous, in that it 
places the blame on the IRA for attacks against the Irish population by the 
British army and the RIC. While undoubtedly an unintentional consequence 
of his use of the principle of proportionality, within a just war framework this 
effectively absolves the British forces of any responsibility for their own ac-
tions, and attributes it entirely to the IRA. The argument is that, IRA actions 
inevitably being the cause of a disproportionate response, the IRA actions 
themselves were unjustified because they were to blame for this response. This 
argument does not stand up, because it assumes the British response was in-
evitable or unavoidable rather than a war policy which was consciously for-
mulated and pursued by Westminster. Cohalan undoubtedly saw the British 
response as being excessive and unjustified, and described it in similar terms 
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to the IRA campaign, but that does not necessarily mean that he actually 
viewed them as being equivalent in moral terms.
The major point of Cohalan’s just war approach is the rejection of the 
Republic as a sovereign independent state,78 and hence of its authority to 
wage war. The British state, though its methods were unjustifiable, was still 
the sovereign state of Great Britain and Ireland, and as such it still had a 
moral right to declare war. Cohalan’s disapproval of the shooting of “police-
men” echoes that of Benedict XV, and similarly represents the situation as not 
being a state of war but of rebellion, a state of unrest internal to the United 
Kingdom,79 even though he must have been aware that the RIC at that time 
were not police but a paramilitary force. His response to Cardinal Bourne’s 
statement that an oath-bound society was responsible for the killing of Brit-
ish agents on Bloody Sunday was to explain that the situation was a response 
to the erroneous belief that, because the elected representatives of the Irish 
people had declared a Republic, it was in fact a Republic, and that the RIC 
were simply overstepping the mark in doing their duty.80 However, as Cork-
ery points out,81 the interpretation of the just war principle of competent au-
thority Cohalan gave in his 1921 Lenten Pastoral was rather strained. While 
acknowledging that the Irish people had chosen their elected representatives, 
he viewed these members of the Dáil as being “advocates of the policy... of 
Ireland to choose her form of government”82 rather than as simply constitut-
ing the form of government that had resulted from Ireland’s exercise of that 
right. Likewise, he denied that the elected members of the Dáil could uni-
laterally declare a Republic, despite having been elected on the promise that 
they would do so, and also denied that they had the right to defend the Re-
public in arms.83 Therefore, Cohalan seems to have interpreted the results of 
the 1918 General Election as being a moral assertion of the right to elect rep-
resentatives rather than an act of self-determination in itself. By denying that 
the Dáil had the right to fulfil its own raison d’être he was denying that the 
Dáil had any authority to pass laws and implement policies; in other words, 
he was denying the very right he appeared to be defending.
This view is expressed even more clearly in Cohalan’s 1922 Pastoral 
Letter, where he claimed that the oath taken by the Dáil in 1919 was not 
an oath “for the establishment of an Irish Republic” but one of fidelity to 
the Republic as already existing, and therefore, because neither Republic nor 
government actually existed, the oath was invalid.84 The distinction Cohalan 
makes here is obscure, as it is hard to imagine how the Dáil could fulfil an 
oath to establish a Republic if it had no authority to do so, yet he appeared 
to envisage a situation in which it could — just not the current one. He seems 
to have been arguing that no government elected by the Irish people could 
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have self-declared political authority over the island. This view of legitimacy 
coincides with that of Walter McDonald; both agreed that the Imperial Par-
liament was the sole authority in Ireland, regardless of what its people might 
think, and that if a Republic were to be declared, that declaration could only 
come from the Imperial Parliament. Lest this interpretation seem an exag-
geration of Cohalan’s position, one need only refer to the position of the bish-
ops following the Treaty settlement, to be discussed below, that not only was 
the Provisional government, set up after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
in 1922, the legitimate government of Ireland, but that it succeeded the Im-
perial Government in this regard, which was, therefore, likewise considered 
to have been the legitimate government of Ireland. The government set up on 
the basis of the 1918 elections was, consequently, illegitimate. The legitimate 
succession endorsed by Cohalan and the other bishops was the Free State 
Government, set up on the basis of the Better Government of Ireland Act 
1920, an act passed by a Parliament which the Irish people had no part in 
electing, succeeding the Imperial Government, which likewise had not been 
elected by the people of Ireland but nevertheless claimed to have the right to 
govern Ireland. It should be noted that this position is essentially indistin-
guishable from that of the bishops’ Protestant counterparts.
Cohalan’s denunciation of violence during the Anglo-Irish War, while 
it appeared to be even-handed, relied on the view that the Sinn Féin Gov-
ernment was simply a party which had temporarily refused to take its place 
in Westminster, its proper and only place. Hence one finds Cohalan engaging 
in apologetics for RIC (Black and Tan and Auxiliary) atrocities in his 1920 
Christmas Pastoral Letter, where he refers to them as “police,” implying that 
they were simply engaged in their normal functions and that their excess-
es were simply a response to pressure from the IRA.85 Far from considering 
the methods of either side, Cohalan simply placed the blame on the IRA for 
initiating the conflict in the first place, thus causing a “spiral” in which the 
British Government and its agents played no conscious part. Secondly, in his 
failure to properly explicate his reasoning on the grounds of lawful authority, 
Cohalan refused to commit explicitly to a position that would either give le-
gitimacy to the Sinn Féin Government or withhold it. He affirmed the prin-
ciple of democratic self-determination for Ireland while at the same time 
condemning those efforts to secure it which involved military means. While 
Cohalan’s concern at the destruction of life and property that ensued during 
the War was undoubtedly sincere, he never questioned the right of the British 
Government to wage war in Ireland. Neither, for that matter, did he question 
the right of the British Government to continue governing in Ireland, despite 
his professed belief in the right to self-determination.
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The most substantial response from the Protestant side to the Anglo-
Irish War came from Dr Charles D’Arcy, Church of Ireland Bishop of Dub-
lin (later Bishop of Armagh), who, in his address to the Church Synod, took 
the opportunity to advise the British Government as to its approach. He 
stated that the course should be considered carefully, and, once decided on, 
should be prosecuted “with the ruthlessness of fate”.86 The policy he advo-
cated was the commitment by Britain of all the resources at its disposal to 
Ireland, as the wiser course would be too many soldiers rather than too few, 
and excessive force rather than yielding to the forces of disorder. Comparing 
D’Arcy’s pronouncement with those of the Catholic bishops, one is struck 
by the openness with which he was prepared to advocate the infliction of any 
degree of force sooner than accept the alternative, which was to admit that 
the de jure government of Ireland was also the de facto one. He also made the 
frank admission that the issue at stake was nothing less than British rule in 
Ireland.
Rev. Patrick Gannon recognised the significance of D’Arcy’s utterance, 
and went so far as to connect it directly with the commencement of the Black 
and Tan campaign.87 Whether or not it had any actual influence on policy, it 
forms an interesting analogue to Cohalan’s condemnation of the IRA’s mili-
tary operations, in that it provided an ecclesiastical seal of approval for RIC 
actions that Cohalan, given his audience, chose not to give. However, Gan-
non argued that D’Arcy’s sentiments were entirely inappropriate; D’Arcy was 
a primate of a national Church, yet according to Gannon, he was calling for 
the invasion of his own country by another, as the rule of that other country 
over his own was at stake, and that nothing must be left to chance in securing 
that end.88 Furthermore, in response to a statement by the Catholic bishops 
of 26 April 1922, D’Arcy, in a letter co-authored with the Protestant Bishop 
of Down and Connor, the Moderator of the Presbyterian General Assembly 
and the President of the Methodist Conference, engaged in an attempt to 
justify anti-Catholic pogroms in the North. This letter advised the Catholic 
bishops to preach “submission to the authority of the community to which 
[they belonged],” yet, as Gannon stated in response, D’Arcy failed to answer 
the question of what he meant by his use of the term “community,” or from 
where legitimate political authority derives within such a community. Gan-
non further traces the origin of the current strife to the failure to satisfactorily 
address that question.89 The irony is that such criticisms apply just as well to 
the stance of the Irish bishops. That is not to say that they, like D’Arcy, were 
willing to call openly for the application of whatever military force was re-
quired to reassert British rule in Ireland. However, they answered Gannon’s 
question regarding the origin of political authority in Ireland by asserting 
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that it lay in Westminster, in the sense that they denied Ireland the right to 
declare independence or convene its own assembly without permission from 
the Imperial Parliament; if it did so without such permission, that assembly 
therefore had no legitimacy. Even when the consequences of Britain’s war 
policy in Ireland were plain to see, the objections the Catholic bishops raised 
addressed only the means employed, not the end that they served. The funda-
mental agreement therefore remained, that Ireland was not entitled to secede 
from Britain unless Britain so decided.
The Church of Ireland Gazette provided support for D’Arcy’s call for 
ruthless military repression by making claims that were similar in many ways 
to those used to justify Britain’s involvement in the First World War.90 Wit-
ness, as if in answer to the rhetoric it had employed in 1916, portrayed many 
military actions against Protestant targets as sectarian attacks,91 and in any 
case as simple murders with no possible justification. Its editorial of 17 June 
1921 referred to “local bands of lawless men” who attacked Protestants out of 
animosity or because they coveted their property. However, it also stated that 
the Roman Catholic population had provided Sinn Féin “with a sphere of in-
fluence and moral, or rather should we say, immoral support” which made the 
latter’s work possible.92 It also made an interesting distinction in this regard 
which is worth noting. Referring to Sinn Féin’s claim that attacks on Protes-
tants were not made by virtue of their religion but because they acted against 
Sinn Féin, it stated that since Protestants “cannot do otherwise by virtue of 
their religion,” it is a distinction without a difference. Therefore, it conced-
ed that attacks against Protestants were not motivated by their religion, but 
rather by their political allegiances. The attempt to conflate politics and reli-
gion, by arguing that these Protestants were bound by virtue of their faith to 
be loyal to the Empire, reflects Imperial assumptions concerning the inextri-
cability of Protestantism and Britishness, rather than a serious analysis of the 
political situation. The argument that Protestants were targeted, not because 
they acted against legally constituted authority in Ireland, but because of their 
own identification of Protestantism with loyalty to the Imperial Parliament 
is essentially a claim that they were targeted because of their own self-iden-
tification. Witness clearly did see a difference between the political and reli-
gious issues, but tried to reconcile, or obscure, that difference in its analysis.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty
The Irish Catholic bishops, in contrast to their refusal to give moral 
backing to the Irish Government and their condemnation of the IRA, gave 
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their unreserved support to the Treaty and the Free State Government. Arch-
bishops Gilmartin and Harty, along with Bishops Cohalan, Hallinan of Lim-
erick, and O’Doherty of Galway, embraced the Free State Government as 
the true government of Ireland, emphasising the consent of the people as the 
sole criterion for the legitimacy of government.93 This opinion was reinforced 
and consolidated in the joint pastoral of 10 October 1922, in which the bish-
ops spelled out their teaching on obedience to lawful authority. According 
to this letter, the government “set up by the nation” commanded the respect 
and obedience of all citizens, regardless of what particular form that govern-
ment might take. Correlatively, revolt against a government thus legitimate-
ly established was unjustifiable. Hence, the rebellion against the Free State 
Government by the anti-Treaty faction of the IRA was condemned in terms 
which recall Cohalan’s condemnation of the IRA, in that all the destruction 
caused in the Civil War, much of it actually perpetrated by Free State forces 
using weaponry supplied by the British, was attributed entirely to the anti-
Treaty forces.94 Indeed, the bishops claimed that the IRA was responsible for 
more destruction during the Civil War than was caused by British forces in 
30 years. However, such claims indicated that bishops were willing to extend 
their full support to the Free State Government as the legitimate government 
of Ireland, a claim they never supported in the case of the elected government 
of Ireland during the Anglo-Irish War.
The principal basis for the bishops’ approval of the Free State Govern-
ment was its election by popular mandate. The bishops did not refer to oth-
er circumstances that might have differentiated that particular election from 
previous ones as far as legitimacy was concerned, nor did they address any 
potential mitigating circumstances that could have accounted for a rebel-
lion against the imposition of the Treaty. However, they were by no means 
so committed to the principle of self-determination by popular mandate in 
the case of the 1918 Election, or, for that matter, the 1921 Election, in both 
of which a separatist government was indisputably chosen by the people. On 
the contrary, they refused to admit that that government was legitimate, re-
gardless of the strength of the mandate. It might be asked what caused such 
a change in perspective on the part of the bishops, given that the evaluation 
they employed did not appeal to non-moral considerations.
The elections both during and after the Anglo-Irish War were conduct-
ed under the auspices of the Imperial Parliament under conditions of more 
or less universal suffrage, and the popular vote resulted in governments be-
ing set up in Dublin according to the majority preference that was expressed, 
and the governments expressed their intention of fulfilling the mandate they 
had been given. However, the 1918 Election was called by a British govern-
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ment which had, strictly speaking, not been elected, as the electoral franchise 
was not renewed in 1915, when it had fallen due, because of the First World 
War. The 1923 Election took place under the Government of Ireland Act 
1920, which mandated that Ireland was to be governed by two separate par-
liaments, Northern and Southern. This Act was passed by the British parlia-
ment in the name of Ireland, even though there was already a parliament in 
Ireland which had been elected by the people and as such had sole author-
ity to legislate for Ireland. The Free State Government proceeded to imple-
ment the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, acting under the terms of the Free 
State Constitution which had essentially been drafted by the British. Nei-
ther of these documents was submitted for ratification by the electorate, and 
the terms of the Treaty were not even published until the day of the election. 
Therefore, unlike the 1918 and 1921 Elections, the 1923 Election saw the 
electorate being led by a government which they had elected into accepting 
the voluntary self-limitation of that government’s authority according to the 
terms of an agreement on which they were never consulted.
Therefore, the bishops embraced the Free State Government as the 
choice of the electorate, and likewise embraced its commitment to enforce 
the Treaty. They had rejected the Sinn Féin Government’s authority under 
the very same criteria they now applied to the Free State Government, even 
though both governments were elected by the people. Further, the bishops 
accepted without question the Free State’s right to wage war against the anti-
Treaty forces, where they had previously rejected as immoral the IRA’s cam-
paign and denied that the Sinn Féin Government had the moral authority 
to sanction or direct military action. It is difficult to conclude that the bish-
ops were correct in these varying understandings of legitimacy. Cohalan had 
asserted the right of the Irish people to self-determination while rejecting 
the actual manifestation because, to put it bluntly, the Imperial Parliament 
had played no role in underwriting that manifestation. The bishops recog-
nised the Free State Government as the sovereign authority in Ireland sim-
ply because of the part played by the Imperial Parliament in arranging that 
state of affairs. The Free State Government was obliged under the terms of 
the Treaty to refrain from matters pertaining to foreign and military affairs; 
hence, in fostering the notion that the Free State Government constituted 
some kind of achievement of sovereign authority, the bishops were in fact 
fostering an illusion.95 The Free State Government had no freedom of choice 
in the areas that mattered; it was not a sovereign government, and a vote for 
the pro-Treaty side was not self-determination, but simply a vote within a 
constitutional framework defined by Westminster.96 Yet for this very reason 
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the bishops were willing for the first time to acknowledge the authority of 
the popular vote.
The southern Protestant hierarchy likewise gave the Free State their 
full backing, just as it had the British forces whose continued government of 
Ireland they had supported in the Anglo-Irish War, referring to it as the only 
protection against the “forces of anarchy”.97 Witness reported the killing of 
“Protestants”, actually loyalist informers who also happened to be Protestants, 
in Dunmanway, Co. Cork.98 Perhaps in an attempt to distract from the fact of 
official encouragement and support for anti-Catholic pogroms in Ulster, the 
Church of Ireland Gazette painted a picture of an all-out purge of Protestants 
by hard-pressed anti-Treaty forces in Tipperary, Westmeath and Galway.99 
However, regardless of the failure of the Free State Government to prevent 
such supposed anti-Protestant cleansing from taking place, so unreserved had 
Protestant support become for the Government that the Gazette contributed 
a fulsome tribute to Michael Collins on the occasion of his death.100
Protestant support for the Free State shared common ground with that 
of the Catholic bishops, namely, a professed concern for order as against the 
disorder manifested in the Civil War. However, though the symptoms were 
invoked as evidence, the causes were not examined by either Catholic or 
Protestant churches, perhaps because both shared the common presuppo-
sition that Ireland could only be governed from Westminster, and that any 
attempt to assert otherwise was self-refuting. Consistent with the eagerness 
with which they had urged war on whomever Westminster decided was the 
enemy, whether German or Irish, the Protestant prelates shared the Catholic 
bishops’ view that opposition to the Free State must be dealt with militarily. 
The conclusion can be drawn that neither Protestant nor Catholic Churches 
in Ireland were prepared to evaluate the morality of armed force on its own 
terms, but were rather inclined to do so according to the political affiliation 
of those who essayed it.
Conclusion
While the Catholic bishops were less ready than their Protestant coun-
terparts to approve of military action against officially declared enemies of the 
British Empire, their objections were based largely on the means employed 
rather than the morality of the resort to force itself. The presumption seems 
to have been that, irrespective of the means, whether in Europe or in Ireland, 
the British state was not at fault in waging war. The question of right au-
thority was in fact never seriously applied to the British state by the Catholic 
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bishops. On the other hand, where Ireland was concerned, bishops such as 
Cohalan insisted on applying the full rigour of just war theory. What notable 
exceptions there were to this pattern tended to occur lower in the hierarchy, 
while on the Protestant side there were no exceptions to speak of. Protestant 
and Catholic churches alike adhered to the consensus that while the Imperial 
Government had no case to answer for declaring war, Ireland had no right 
to do so of its own initiative. They discerned that this issue, the right to de-
clare war, was a defining characteristic of independent statehood, and were 
consistent in denying it to Ireland, regardless of Irish opinion on the matter.
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